Red Teaming the Rebalance
Red Teaming the Rebalance
The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy, Trump found guilty on all counts,
The Theory and Risks of US Asia Strategy
By Van Jackson (Routledge)
What specific forms of reasoning underlie the US approach to Asia, what downside risks do they imply, and to what extent can they be mitigated? This article examines the theoretical underpinnings of the US “rebalance” to Asia by categorizing US policies according to three types of logic: military power; economic liberalism; and institutionalism.
It then uses international relations theory as a diagnostic tool to assess risks in these approaches. Recent efforts toward improving transparency in contested maritime areas and capacity-building of local allies and partners may address the strategy’s most acute risks, while inevitably generating more in the process.
Mistrust, uncertainty, and widespread military modernization represent mutually reinforcing trends that help explain the high degree of political and military fragmentation in Asia, and consequently the underlying potential for conflict there. A 2014 Pew Research Poll, for instance, found that lack of trust was a common problem across the Asia–Pacific. Difficult to separate from mistrust in the region is the related phenomenon of uncertainty; most states are simply unclear about what the future holds in terms of structural incentives for certain types of foreign policy decisions, leading even some US treaty allies to pursue hedging strategies.
Against a backdrop of mistrust and uncertainty, militaries across the Asia–Pacific are engaged in arms buildups and force modernization despite, in most instances, lacking declared adversaries. China’s growth in military spending is well known, but the trend applies to states large and small.
Even North Korea, long stuck in the early Cold War era technologically, is investing heavily in cyber capabilities, a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles,6 and updated ballistic missile technology. The danger, of course, is that mistrust, uncertainty, and military modernization converge to make the Asia–Pacific a powder keg.
With such a precarious trajectory, how does the United States intend to prevent the worst outcomes imaginable from erupting in the region? What is the “theory” behind US Asia strategy? Since at least 2011, the United States has invested considerable effort and resources across its government in a collection of policies that has been alternately dubbed the “strategic pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia.
Despite a number of speeches by senior Obama administration officials, and by President Obama himself, the logic by which US policies and actions are expected to move the region closer toward the US vision of a stable liberal order remains less than obvious. Yet, with the peace and prosperity of a region at stake, and given the large investment being made by the United States, it seems essential that there be some basis for understanding the logical underpinnings of US efforts.
Doing so also makes it possible to “red team” US strategy; that is, assess the risks of the US approach in the form of unintended consequences, erroneous assumptions, and possible blind spots in US policy. As importantly, it provides a common foundation or lingua franca for policymakers who may wish to debate the degree of change or continuity – and the rationale for it – in the Asia policy of future US presidential administrations. Without a discernable logic, it would be difficult for future administrations to continue the rebalance for reasons other than inertia or political expedience.
This article therefore undertakes two major tasks. The first task is to disaggregate US policies comprising the rebalance according to their logical underpinnings in the international relations literature. This helps us make sense of US word and deed on a consequential policy issue that can often seem esoteric.
The second task is to consider, given the prevailing Asian security landscape and the types of logics at play, risks that inhere in the US approach to Asia. Since every strategy amounts to a bet that certain types of actions are more likely to produce certain types of outcomes, every strategy has risks. Rather than constituting a critique of US policy, flagging risks is a logical first step for mitigating any oversights of, or potential negative feedback from, US policy in the region. This in turn may aid future policymakers in deciding the extent of desired continuity or change with respect to past policies.
Using international relations theory as a diagnostic approach and US word and deed during the Obama administration as evidence, this article argues that US Asia strategy consists of three distinct logics: military power, grounded in defensive realism and deterrence theory; economic liberalism, which traces its roots to economic interdependence theory, modernization theory, and democratic peace theory; and institutionalism, broadly cast in terms of liberal hegemony, neoliberal institutionalism, and theories of norm socialization.
As applied to contemporary Asia, each logic harbors its own risks. The core risks of a military power logic are that the United States will unintentionally feed extant regional security dilemmas, embolden its security clients to take excessively brash actions, and fail to follow through on rhetorical commitments that erode the credibility of US threats and promises. Two key risks also inhere in the economic liberalism approach.
The first is that interdependencies form asymmetrically with China, which may lead the latter to believe either that it holds exploitable leverage over others, or that, fearing the economic costs of a conflagration, there is a ceiling constraining US and ally behavior in a crisis situation. The second risk is that the core assumptions of an economic liberalism approach do not obtain; that is, as Asian states get wealthier, they will not liberalize politically or economically. This would leave Asian states with greater capacity for military armament while simultaneously undercutting any hopes of a democratic peace.
Finally, the logic of an institutionalist approach, as the United States has pursued it, holds out the risk that patterns of institutional formation and legitimation will forsake the liberal purposes the United States desires. This would occur if institutionalism in Asia came to undermine global liberal institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and preferred international norms such as freedom of navigation.
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Trump found guilty on all charges in hush money trial
By CGTN
Former U.S. President and Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump leaves the courtroom after he was convicted in a criminal trial at Manhattan Criminal Court in New York City.
A jury in New York City on Thursday found former U.S. President Donald Trump guilty on all charges in a hush money case.
Trump, 77, was found guilty of all 34 felony counts of falsifying business records in a bid to hide a hush money payment of $130,000 to porn star Stormy Daniels in 2016, shortly before the presidential election.
Trump became the first former president in U.S. history to be convicted of a crime. Justice Juan Merchan set sentencing for July 11, just days before the Republican Party is scheduled to formally nominate Trump for president ahead of the November 5 election.
Trump has denied wrongdoing and an attorney representing him said they would appeal as quickly as possible. The former president, who was released without bail, initially sat still in the drab Manhattan courtroom, shoulders dipping.
"This was a disgrace," Trump told reporters afterward as he proclaimed his innocence and repeated his complaints that the trial had been rigged against him.
An appeal could take months to complete. The trial featured lengthy testimony from the adult performer, whose real name is Stephanie Clifford, who described to the court in graphic detail what she says was a 2006 sexual encounter with the married Trump. Prosecutors successfully laid out a case alleging that the hush money and the illegal covering up of the payment were part of a broader crime to prevent voters from knowing about Trump's behavior.
Trump's defense attorneys had countered that "trying to influence an election" was simply "democracy" and that the former president did nothing wrong.
The crime of falsifying business documents carries a maximum sentence of four years in prison, though those convicted often receive shorter sentences, fines or probation. Incarceration would not legally prevent him from campaigning or taking office if he were to win.
He will not be jailed ahead of sentencing. The verdict plunges the United States into unexplored territory ahead of the November election, when Trump will try to win back the White House from Democratic President Joe Biden.
Biden's campaign issued a statement saying that the trial showed "no one is above the law." It added that "the threat Trump poses to our democracy has never been greater."
Should Trump win the presidency he will not be able to pardon himself, given that the case was not brought by the federal government but by the state of New York, where only the governor could clear his name. Opinion polls show Trump and Biden, 81, locked in a tight race, and Reuters/Ipsos polling has found that a guilty verdict could cost Trump some support among independent and Republican voters.
The case had been widely regarded as the least consequential of the four criminal prosecutions Trump faces. However, the verdict looms large now, as it is likely to be the only one before the election, with others delayed by procedural challenges.