The Russian Gambit
Russia ready to 'play long game' in Ukraine as Putin proposes economist as new defence chief, VDL and Europe’s Non-European Elections,
Russia ready for “Long Game' in Ukraine
By Yang Sheng and Bai Yunyi (Global Times)
"In the future, Russia will try to combine its military targets with the demands of economic development, to make economic growth support the military operation and to make the military operation give momentum to development and drive sci-tech development,"
Russia is ready to "play the long game" in Ukraine and balance the sustainable demand of its military operation with economic development, said experts on Monday, as a senior official who specialized in the economy was proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to become the new defense minister.
According to TASS on Sunday, Putin has proposed appointing Andrei Belousov, who previously served as the first deputy prime minister, as Russia's new defense minister. Russia's current defense chief Sergey Shoigu will replace Nikolay Patrushev as the Security Council Secretary.
Other heads of security ministries and services, as well as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, will retain their posts in the government. The president has also proposed appointing Boris Kovalchuk as the Chairman of the Accounts Chamber, a post that has been vacant for one and a half years.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the decision to appoint Belousov as the defense minister is linked to the need to "make the economy of the security bloc part of the country's economy." The current budget of the defense ministry is nearing the level of the 1980s, "which is not critical but... extremely important."
Belousov's appointment "will in no way change the current coordination system" in terms of defense issues, Peskov noted.
"On the battlefield today, the winner is the one that is more open to innovation, and therefore, at this stage, the president has made a decision for a civilian to head the Defense Ministry," Peskov said in response to a question about the new appointment.
"Belousov has no military background and appointing him as the new defense chief is aimed at using his economic expertise and experience to guarantee that the costly military demands are met, and to ensure that economic development will not be affected by the military operation in Ukraine at the same time," Cui Heng, a scholar from the Shanghai-based China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation, told the Global Times on Monday.
Belousov, a Russian economist and government official, was born in Moscow on March 17, 1959. He graduated in 1981 with honors from Moscow State University where he studied economics.
He had been in various positions relating to economic matters before in 2020 when Belousov was appointed Russia's first deputy prime minister, and has held this position ever since.
In his capacity as deputy prime minister, Belousov handled the development of the primary vectors of Russia's social-economic development, coordination of efforts to fulfill Russia's national development goals and the completion of national projects, matters of unitary financial, credit and monetary policy, and the regulation of financial markets.
From 2022, Belousov also supervised the development of high-tech transportation technologies and intelligent control systems.
The decision to appoint Belousov proves that Russia is getting ready to "play the long game" in Ukraine, Cui said. Russia needs to use limited economic resources to pay for the military operation, which nobody knows at what point will end, and it seems like the Kremlin believes that the conflict is unlikely to end this year, he noted.
Yang Jin, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, echoed the view. Yang said that at this stage, Russia has realized that it cannot rely on purely military measures to solve the problem with Ukraine, but also needs to ensure sustainable development and a stable domestic society.
Some observers said Belousov is also one of the senior Russian officials who helped Russia successfully overcome the difficulties resulting from Western sanctions and realize economic growth for the country since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and this is also part of the reason why he has been selected for the key position of defense chief.
"In the future, Russia will try to combine its military targets with the demands of economic development, to make economic growth support the military operation and to make the military operation give momentum to development and drive sci-tech development," Wang Xiaoquan, an expert with the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Monday.
"This could probably become a special wartime economy for Russia under a hybrid warfare situation," Wang noted.
Chinese analysts do not believe that the change of defense chief will affect the military operation in Ukraine, as the whole military command structure of Russian forces has not been impacted, and Shoigu will continue playing a key role in the field of national security and remain close to Russia's top leadership. The new appointment also implied that Moscow seems not in a rush to end the conflict, whether Washington or Kiev want to continue to fight or not, experts noted.
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Europe’s Non-European Elections
By Alberto Alemanno (Project Syndicate)
In 2019, when von der Leyen was handpicked by EU leaders, she was chosen over the election winner, Manfred Weber, also from the EPP.
VIENNA – The first-ever debate between the candidates for the European Commission’s presidency late last month failed to provide a compelling reason for Europeans to participate in June’s European Parliament elections. Instead, it exposed some inconvenient and embarrassing truths about the bloc’s political system.
For starters, there is nothing distinctly European about these elections. Voters across the European Union will cast their ballots on different dates: Dutch citizens will vote on June 6; Irish on June 7; Czechs, Slovaks, Latvians, and Maltese on June 8; and the rest on June 9. Moreover, different electoral laws apply, with the voting age set at 16 in Austria, Belgium, and Germany; 17 in Greece; and 18 in the remaining EU member states.
Moreover, the EU lacks a pan-European political-party system. Instead, voters cast their ballots for candidates selected by national, rather than European, parties. Although most national parties participating in the EU elections are affiliated with European political parties like the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), or Identity and Democracy (ID), the latter remain relatively obscure and unfamiliar to the average voter.
In fact, national parties are not required to join any of the existing European parties, and even when they do, they rarely highlight their EU affiliation on national ballots. Consequently, these “europarties” are loose extra-parliamentary coalitions of parties from multiple member states. Not many German voters, for example, realize that when they vote for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), they are also indirectly supportingFrance’s Les Républicains, Italy’s Forza Italia, and Poland’s Civic Platform. Similarly, how many Italians know that by voting for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, they are also backing Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party and Spain’s Vox at the EU level?
This structural problem is compounded by the lack of pan-European public opinion. Even though member states cooperate on an ever-expanding list of issues like economic policy, climate change, and security, Europeans primarily receive information about EU developments from domestic sources. These accounts are inherently biased, frequently misinformed, and generally misleading, partly because national politicians tend to deflect blame by scapegoating the EU. Unsurprisingly, most MEP candidates focus their campaigns on national rather than European issues.
Consequently, the EU lacks a political environment capable of fostering a truly transnational space for pan-European policy debates. Such spaces should exist both within and outside EU institutions, enabling citizens to understand, influence, and participate in decision-making that affects their shared interests as Europeans.
Simply put, the EU is in dire need of a shared political identity. As former Italian Prime Ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi recently noted, the absence of such an identity makes it harder for the EU to address its defense, immigration, and environmental challenges.
The recent debate in Maastricht, which featured current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and several leading candidates vying to replace her, underscored these structural flaws. Despite marking von der Leyen’s first public questioning since assuming office, the debate failed to capture the interest of EU voters, attracting only about 15,000 viewers.
The debate also showed that these aspiring Commission presidents, including von der Leyen, might not ultimately be chosen. That is because selecting the Commission’s president requires a dual majority, first from the 27 EU leaders who nominate the candidate, and then from the European Parliament’s 705 (soon to be 720) members.
Moreover, there is no consensus among the major European parties on whether the presidency should automatically go to the candidate of the party that receives the most votes. This was the case in 2014 with Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate for the EPP, but not in 2019, when von der Leyen was handpicked by EU leaders who chose her over the election winner, Manfred Weber, also from the EPP.
In fact, the only requirement imposed on EU leaders when selecting their presidential nominee is to “take into account” the results of EU elections, reflecting the new political majority in the incoming Parliament. If European leaders try to install a Commission president who lacks support from voters, Parliament should uphold this rule and reject their choice.
Such a scenario, while unprecedented, would hold EU leaders accountable for their decisions, demonstrating to the average EU voter that their vote matters. It would also ensure that the political direction of the next European administration is determined by the electorate, as is the case in every other parliamentary system. Ultimately, only a citizen-driven EU, accountable to its elected legislature, could possess the capacity and mandate to tackle the bloc’s many current and future challenges.
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Dear friends, Xi and Putin meet in Beijing
By Greg Torode and Guy Faulconbridge (AFR/Reuters)
But despite the “no limits” relationship – declared by Mr Putin and his “dear friend” Mr Xi in Beijing just days before the launch of the invasion in February 2022 – China has avoided providing actual weapons and ammunition for Russia’s war effort.
While diplomats and analysts expect Mr Putin to push Mr Xi for further support for Russia’s war economy, from machines and chemicals to help its military industries to more discounted oil and gas purchases, Mr Putin’s trip is likely to be heavily symbolic of a shared world view centred on countering a US-led order.
‘In Beijing, they truly understand’
In an interview with China’s news agency Xinhua published early on Wednesday, Mr Putin backed China’s plan for a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine crisis.
“In Beijing, they truly understand its root causes and its global geopolitical meaning,” Mr Putin said, according to a Russian language transcript published on a Kremlin website.
Mr Putin will also discuss economic ties with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and visit Harbin, a northeast city with historic Russian connections.
Mr Putin’s arrival follows a mission to Beijing late last month from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in part to warn China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, against deepening military support for Russia.
Mr Blinken said Beijing’s supply of dual use goods was “powering Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine”.
But despite the “no limits” relationship – declared by Mr Putin and his “dear friend” Mr Xi in Beijing just days before the launch of the invasion in February 2022 – China has avoided providing actual weapons and ammunition for Russia’s war effort.
China needs to have Russia on its side to subvert the US-led world order.
And despite initial internal US talks about sanctioning Chinese banks, US officials said last month they did not have such plans.
“I’m sure Putin would like to have China’s help in getting Russia over the line in Ukraine,” said Alexander Neill, a Singapore-based defence analyst.
“What more China can do without incurring action from Washington will be a very closely scrutinised element of this mission,” said Mr Neill, an adjunct fellow at Hawaii’s Pacific Forum research institute.
Other analysts said just the Xi and Putin meeting itself carried weight.
“The very act of receiving Putin by Beijing – on its own – is already a form of support to Russia since China is the sole major country left that has not isolated Moscow,” said James Char, a security scholar at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
“China needs to have Russia on its side to subvert the US-led world order and in its long-term struggle with the US for geopolitical supremacy.”
Mutual scepticism
More broadly, other limits remain on the relationship, however.
Mr Char noted a lingering mutual mistrust – the one-time ideological communist allies split at the height of the Cold War – while a senior Russian source highlighted scepticism among Moscow’s elites over becoming China’s “resource appendage”.
Russian oil arrivals into China, including via pipelines under long-term contracts, rose one quarter last year to a record 2.14 million barrels per day, making Moscow its top supplier for a second straight year.
Data analysed by Reuters shows China saved roughly $US4.34 billion ($6.5 billion) in the first nine months of 2023 buying discounted Russian oil.
China’s Russian gas imports last year soared nearly 40 per cent from 2022 at 33.7 billion cubic metres, according to Reuters calculations of customs figures and data from consultancy RBAC.
Despite the rise, Kremlin-owned energy giant Gazprom is still struggling to fill the gap of lost European gas sales.
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