US Narrative Embrace

Embracing China Was Greatest Strategic Failure, Embracing China, Cambodian PM approached by US, China and Latin America: A pragmatic embrace, China's embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran in the cold

May 16, 2024

Embracing Communist China Was U.S.’ Greatest Strategic Failure

By James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer

From the war in Ukraine to the horrific terror attack on Oct. 7 and the subsequent conflict in the Middle East to the roiling waters of the South China Sea, the world today is in crisis. The causes are not found in Moscow or Tehran alone, but primarily in Washington and Beijing. They are the consequence of two fundamental and interrelated grand strategic mistakes made by the U.S. First, the failure to understand the threat from the People’s Republic of China. Second, the failure to balance against it. As a result, the U.S. is at risk of losing its dominant position to an emboldened PRC working in cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the mullahs in Iran. Surveying the global unrest, Americans must comprehend three reasons why they face this dire strategic landscape.

First, U.S. elites did not perceive the threat due to the triumphalism of the “End of History” – the false assertion that modernizing nations like China were on the path to democratization and free market economics. Great power conflict was seen as an artifact of the past. This hubris contributed to what we term “threat deflation,” where year after year U.S. decision-makers consistently dismissed or underestimated the threat from the PRC.

Second, U.S. business interests and financiers indefatigably sought economic gain from cooperation with Beijing. This facilitated China’s rise as it entered the West’s economic ecosystem, as did its admission to the World Trade Organization.

Their influence on the major U.S. political parties and at the highest levels of U.S. politics hindered the U.S. response and promoted the conceit of globalization. Thus emerged an “engagement school,” which asserted that by engaging the PRC, it would become wealthy, a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order, and even democratic. In essence, the U.S. willingly and enthusiastically taught, trained, and even equipped, its mortal enemy. Business interests and financiers funded our national security think tanks which contributed to a bias towards the engagement school, and thus to the threat deflation of the PRC.

Third, Deng Xiaoping, arguably one of the greatest strategists of the 20^th century, advanced a brilliant political warfare strategy to promote threat deflation. Deng’s strategy focused on U.S. and other Western elites, enriching them, and shaping their perception of the PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party, while using the enticement of a growing market to influence their behavior. For a generation, Chinese leaders masked their intentions and framed their expansion as economic, for the good of all, rather than strategic and for the benefit of the CCP.

Consequently, the PRC has risen and now employs its power to the detriment of U.S. national security through its worldwide actions, especially in the East and South China Seas and Taiwan, as well as through its proxies in Iran and Russia.

To meet this threat, Washington first needs to see the Communist China for what it is: an aggressive great power which seeks the overthrow of the U.S.

Second, the U.S. must support the education of strategists so younger generations may understand how to defeat the PRC. Education in the principles of power politics and the CCP’s ideology are essential to achieve victory.

Third, there must be sustained presidential leadership to define the enemy, educate the American people, and generate the necessary whole-of-government response.

Fourth, the failure of the intelligence community to identify China as an existential threat greatly weakened the ability of American national security decision-makers to identify and act against the threat. The fundamental assumptions regarding China’s behavior were informed by the engagement school of thought. Ultimately, and perversely, the intelligence community was aiding threat deflation for a generation. This must be reversed.

Fifth, U.S. military leadership did not recognize and prepare for China’s emergence as a formidable military power. It must also be held accountable for the current state of unpreparedness. Specifically, the failure of the U.S. Navy’s leadership to recognize the centrality of the maritime domain to the PRC’s grand strategy and its naval modernization efforts stands in stark contrast to pro-active performance of prior generations of admirals from World War II through the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Leadership needs to prioritize rebuilding the U.S. Navy to meet the PRC threat.

The U.S. aided the rise of its enemy. Now the Kremlin and Iran are operating in the strategic space that the PRC provides them. That space and Beijing’s aggression will only increase if the U.S. does not act to end its threat deflation, break the chokehold of the engagement school on the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and defeat the CCP by evicting it from power.

Embracing China, new Cambodian PM approached by US

By Sun Narin and Colin Meyn (*Repost from VOA April 2024)

Cambodia's first leadership change in almost four decades has given the United States an opportunity to reset its relationship with Phnom Penh, analysts and experts told VOA Khmer following a recent visit from an American diplomat.

However, Cambodia's slide away from democracy — along with claims that China is establishing an exclusive military presence at Cambodia's main naval base — continues to pose a major impediment to warming relations, they said in recent interviews.

Sebastian Strangio, the author of Hun Sen's Cambodia, said some voices in U.S. foreign policy circles were questioning the effectiveness of Washington's prevailing Cambodia policy even before former Prime Minister Hun Sen handed control to his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, in August — ending the father's 38-year reign.

"There has been discussion amongst people who pay attention to Southeast Asia that the very moralistic tone of American policy toward Cambodia, really since the early '90s, has failed to achieve its goals, while also opening up the space for China to step in as Hun Sen's benefactor and patron, and that some sort of change in emphasis was needed," he said during an interview with VOA Khmer on March 28.

Strangio described tension between leading Hun Sen critics in Congress, who want human rights and democracy at the forefront of Cambodia policy, and more pragmatic figures in the State Department who are willing to sacrifice principles for more influence in Phnom Penh.

The coming to power of Manet, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, "has given an opportunity for the country to take a new approach, or for people advocating a new approach to get more of a hearing," Strangio said.

That shift was on full display after July's election. The U.S. initially froze $18 million in foreign aid to Cambodia in protest of the election, pointing to a "pattern of threats and harassment" against opposition politicians, journalists and civil society ahead of the vote.

Two months later, after Hun Manet was sworn in, Victoria Nuland, the acting U.S. deputy secretary of state, met with the new prime minister in New York and informed him the U.S. would unfreeze the funds.

Analysts say Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink's visit to Phnom Penh in late February showed the delicate balance the United States is pursuing, highlighting areas of agreement without entirely abandoning its stated priorities since helping broker peace in Cambodia 30 years ago.

The U.S. envoy, in an online news conference March 7, said he raised "areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media," while also reiterating the U.S. commitment to "a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country."

Kritenbrink praised Cambodia at the United Nations for cooperating with sanctions against North Korea and consistently condemning Russia's war in Ukraine.

Astrid Norén-Nilsson, a senior lecturer at the Center for East and South-East Asian Studies at Sweden's Lund University, said the U.S. "commitment to Cambodia remains fundamentally geopolitical."

She noted Hun Manet's government was sending some positive signals on the domestic front, despite the political repression.

"The new government's focus on administrative reform, its discourse of meritocracy, and its technocratic approach to policy also allow Western governments to latch on to its policy agendas," she said.

Kritenbrink said he and Hun Manet discussed the Ream Naval base, a pain point between the countries that has prompted U.S. sanctions against top military figures.

The U.S. accuses Cambodia of allowing China to develop the base as an exclusive Chinese naval outpost. Cambodia denies any such deal and says China will not have any special access to the base.

Paul Chambers, of the Center of ASEAN Community Studies at Naresuan University in Thailand, said Kritenbrink's visit was "meant to send a message to Cambodia that leading U.S. officials are worried about Cambodia's tilt to China.''

Chambers said the high level of Chinese military and economic involvement in Cambodia would remain a roadblock to expanding cooperation with Washington.

"It will deeply worsen U.S.-Cambodia relations unless there is an offset — Cambodia allows equal levels of U.S. security activity with Cambodia," he said in an email to VOA Khmer on March 13. Cambodia canceled its annual joint military drills with the United States in 2017.

Sophal Ear, an associate professor at the Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University and a longtime Cambodia observer, was optimistic about a potential breakthrough in U.S.-Cambodia relations.

"Timing is everything. Rapprochement may be on the menu," he said in an email last month.
"Cambodia is strategically located in Southeast Asia and is crucial to regional dynamics," he added. "Engaging with Cambodia allows the U.S. to promote its governance, trade, and regional security interests."

However, other analysts said the United States is likely unwilling to take steps that would significantly change the state of relations.

Christopher Primiano, an assistant professor of political science at Huntingdon College in Alabama who studies China's role in Southeast Asia, said Washington is not interested in competing with China in military or economic support for Hun Manet's government.

And though the tone from U.S. diplomats may have shifted to some extent, he told VOA in a phone call last week that criticism around democracy and human rights hasn't stopped.

"This will always be a source of discontent for the leadership in Cambodia," he said. "If the U.S. government were very interested in Cambodia as a security partner, then we think that we would see less naming and shaming."

China and Latin America: A pragmatic embrace

By Ted Piccone (CSIS reposted from 2020)

China’s maturing relationship with the diverse nations of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), driven primarily by economic security interests, is facing new challenges as the struggling region copes with an intensifying wave of economic, public security, and public health crises. Eager to find new paths out of their chronic underdevelopment, the region’s governments largely welcomed Beijing’s entry into the hemisphere in the mid-2000s.

The honeymoon of this first decade of growth, mainly in trade and investment ties, has morphed, however, into a more pragmatic embrace circumscribed by a mix of both popular and elite skepticism of the benefits of getting too close to Beijing. Concerns regarding China’s political, environmental, labor, and commercial practices, and their effects on certain constituencies in the region, are generating a pushback in some countries. Overall, however, the benefits of closer ties to China still seem to outweigh the costs and, given limited options amidst a serious economic downturn, LAC countries are likely to continue to invest in stronger relations with Beijing.

The United States, meanwhile, has woken up to the long-term threat China poses to its own longstanding role as the leading power in the region. Bipartisan views are converging on the need for a more robust response to China’s rise both globally and regionally. Although the Trump administration has failed to leverage these trends by setting the proper tone or substance for policies that would help swing relations back toward Washington, the deep roots of U.S.-Latin American relationships could nurture a revival of ties built on a consensus around democracy and human rights, fair trade, and more equitable and sustainable development. Regardless of who wins the presidential election in November, the United States should ramp up a more generous and sophisticated approach to its hemispheric partners so as not to cede more ground to China.

Since it burst on the scene over a decade ago, China’s budding relationship with the LAC region has entered a more complicated stage as both sides test the costs and benefits of a tighter embrace. In economic terms, China has risen in the region from a near non-entity in 2000 to a clear heavyweight in terms of trade and investment. For a region perpetually struggling to reach economic growth rates that would lift millions of its citizens out of poverty, China’s self-proclaimed “win-win” economic statecraft offers the LAC region an important route to expand its reach into global supply chains and finance new infrastructure and energy systems.

As LAC’s dependency on China grows, however, tensions and contradictions are mounting, forcing both sides to navigate more troubled domestic and international waters. The United States, in particular, has ramped up a campaign to compete more directly with Beijing on several fronts, including in its hemisphere. The COVID-19 pandemic has seriously exacerbated these tensions, though China’s own economic downturn may limit its options to exploit the situation, at least for now. Nonetheless, the region’s governments are increasingly desperate for capital and may become more flexible in their dealings with Beijing, if it decides to continue its push into the region against economic headwinds.

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China's embrace of Saudi Arabia leaves Iran out in the cold

Beijing ditches neutrality at opportunity to fill gap left by U.S.

By Tala Taslimi, (Nikkei Asia reposted from 2022)

TEHRAN -- Fears are mounting in Iran that China's rapidly warming relations with Saudi Arabia run counter to Beijing's long-standing pledge of neutrality. Under the banner of non-interference, China has never tried to play the role of a mediator between Iran and rivals in the Middle East. But the joint statements released during President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Saudi Arabia have left policymakers in Tehran wondering if there is a change of direction in China's policies toward the region, especially in the wake of a reduced U.S. presence there.

A joint statement released Friday after the meeting of China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations referred to Iran as a supporter of regional terrorist groups and a proliferator of ballistic missiles and drones. It also noted the importance of addressing "the Iranian nuclear file and destabilizing regional activities."

The inclusion of destabilizing activities has shocked Iranian officials, who have long held that the nuclear negotiations should be solely about its nuclear program.

Furthermore, the joint statement raises the issue of three islands located in the Strait of Hormuz -- Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa -- which are administered by Iran but claimed by the United Arab Emirates. The statement said: "The leaders affirmed their support for all peaceful efforts, including the initiative and endeavors of the United Arab Emirates, to reach a peaceful solution."

The statement caught Iranian officials by surprise. Previously, when Iran requested China to take its side in nuclear talks and work with the E3 countries -- the U.K., Germany and France -- to save the deal, Beijing's response was that it would not interfere and that its views on the region were primarily economic.

Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian tweeted a response, noting that the three islands are "inseparable parts of the pure land of Iran and belong to this motherland forever. In the necessity of respecting the territorial integrity of Iran, we have no complacency with any side."

Mohammad Jamshidi, deputy director of political affairs at the office of Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi, shot back at the categorization of Tehran as a supporter of terrorist groups, tweeting: "Chinese colleagues should remember that when Saudi Arabia and America supported ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups in Syria and destroyed Yemen with brutal military aggression, it was Iran that fought the terrorists to establish stability and security in the region."

Yet, as much as Iran is disappointed with Xi's Saudi visit, it cannot risk taking a tougher stance and damaging relations with Beijing.

"China is not the same with a country like Germany for us. We can summon Germany's ambassador, but not China's," said an Iranian official on the condition of anonymity. "We still consider them as friends and we need them to continue buying oil from us and invest in our oil infrastructure."

Yet, Tehran was so upset that on Saturday it did call in China's ambassador to discuss the controversial joint statement. The exchange was described by the Iranian Foreign Ministry as a "meeting" and not a summoning.

Xi's Dec. 7-10 visit to Saudi Arabia came shortly after he won a third term as China's top leader at the Chinese Communist Party's national congress in late October and represents one of the first overseas trips for the leader after an over two-year hiatus due to the pandemic.

It also comes amid a widening rift between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia over human rights issues and Riyadh's refusal to comply with U.S. President Joe Biden's request to keep oil prices low.

Beijing sees a golden opportunity to establish a foothold in the Middle East and to counter Washington's efforts to shift assets to the Indo-Pacific region.

Matthew Bryza, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, told Nikkei Asia that China is "sending signals to all of us that China has much broader economic and strategic interests than we always assumed."

The Iranians understand that they may be collateral damage in this geopolitical game.

Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter and China is its top customer. At the China-GCC summit, Xi said that the two sides have a high degree of complementarity. "China has a vast consumer market and a complete industrial system, while the GCC, with rich energy and resources, is embracing diversified economic development." This makes the two sides natural partners of cooperation, the Chinese leader said.

During his stay in Saudi Arabia, Xi held bilateral meetings with nearly 20 Arab leaders, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters, deeming Xi's trip as China's largest and highest-level diplomatic action with the Arab world since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

At the China-GCC summit, Xi was joined by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani -- who left the World Cup in Doha to attend -- and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah of Bahrain. Also participating were the crown prince of Kuwait, the deputy prime minister of Oman and the ruler of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates.

Riyadh's grandiose reception of Xi began the moment the Chinese leader's airplane entered Saudi airspace, with four fighter jets from Saudi Arabia's Air Force escorting the plane. These were joined by six other planes that formed red and yellow contrails in a show of respect for the Chinese flag.

Xi's car was greeted with a horseback parade at the Al Yamamah Royal Palace, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman awaited.

The crown prince and Xi signed various agreements including a plan to harmonize China's Belt and Road Initiative with the kingdom's Vision 2030, which aims to reduce Riyadh's dependence on oil. Memorandums of understanding were also signed on hydrogen energy, solar power, direct investments and housing.

Bryza, the former U.S. official, said that while China will not supplant the U.S. as the key security provider in the Middle East, "Geostrategically the U.S. wants to make sure that China is not making inroads that will lead to destabilization and pushing out the U.S."

Mohammed bin Salman is "playing multi-dimensional games," Bryza said, "pursuing viable economic and strategic relationship with world's largest country. It is understandable."

While Iran understands the backdrop of the visit, its policymakers fear that the shift comes at its expense. Xi's endorsement of the China-GCC joint statement -- with elements directly targeting Iran -- is seen as proof of this and has shocked Tehran.

Iran still counts on Chinese investment and on the country buying oil on the black market, albeit at a significant discount.

Despite the discount, "Our sales are good," the Iranian official said. "China, just like Russia, has invested big money in our oil and gas industry. Russians have pledged to invest $40 billion and the Chinese are going to make a similar investment pledge within the next two months," the official said.

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