US Universities Lose Their Shine
The 'higher education business model' adopted by American universities since the 1980s has many drawbacks. Chinese higher education still needs to be improved, but key breakthroughs have been made.
Professor Mahoney of East China Normal University: Differences in the Current Situation of Higher Education in China and the United States
Mahoney believes that the "higher education business model" adopted by many American universities since the 1980s has brought many drawbacks. Chinese higher education still needs to be improved, but key breakthroughs have been made.
Chinese columnist Wang Yingliang
NB: This article is the latest in the series “100 Interviews with 100 People on Sino-US Relations.”
Josef Gregory Mahoney is a professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University (ECNU); founder and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization Studies; founder and director of the International Graduate Program in Political Science; vice president of the Singularity Institute of Politics; associate editor of the American Journal of Chinese Political Science (SSCI); and co-editor of the East China Normal University Review. He is also an adjunct professor of Marxism and a senior researcher at the Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Southeast University in Nanjing, a high-level think tank in Jiangsu Province, and a senior researcher at the Hainan Zhongjinying Peace Development Foundation, a leading security think tank with a special focus on the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative.
The following is the interview content.
- Josef Gregory Mahoney
Q: Few Americans choose to be full professors at Chinese universities. Can you tell me why you chose to teach in China? What are the core driving forces of China's development that you have observed?
Mahoney: In the 1990s, I worked in banking and finance, and then in the U.S. government. I became incredibly disillusioned with those experiences and decided to pursue an academic career. However, before I quit my job in the U.S. government and began my doctoral studies, I spent a year in China. That year was transformative. I left with the clear impression that the Chinese people had figured out things about government and state development that others might have forgotten or perhaps never understood, and I wanted to understand that better. This became the focus of my doctoral research and led me academically toward Marxism and “Chinese Marxism.”
By the early 2000s, I was already a university faculty member in Washington, D.C., and I was also a political activist. I was disliked by the university as a political activist, and I did not renew my contract, but instead found a position at a state university in Michigan. As before, I met and exceeded my professional responsibilities, but I continued to be an activist, organizing workers, advising students protesting police shootings; leading protests against the US war in Iraq; criticizing leaders' abusive policies toward immigrants; serving as a volunteer teacher at a nearby state prison; giving speeches in Cuba; arguing with "Taiwan independence" elements about the fate of the China studies I was doing at the university, and so on. This led to friction with the university, local, state, and federal authorities, and ultimately led to my forced career buyout and "American academic employment blacklist" in 2009.
China is obviously my place of exile. My research base is here, and China also accepts me as a "Marxist". After supporting the translation of Selected Works of Jiang Zemin by the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, I accepted a position at East China Normal University, where I stayed for 15 years, the longest time I worked in Shanghai and the longest time I worked in Shanghai in my life. I am very grateful to China and East China Normal University, and now I am proud to be a permanent resident of China, raising my two children here, and they also want to settle in China.
Q: You teach political science at ECNU, such as Marxism. What ideas do you teach in your courses on ideology? How do students respond to your courses?
Mahoney: I do not teach ideology. My courses provide students with the opportunity to appreciate the unique insights provided by “Marxism” and “Chinese Marxism,” including their related but different epistemological and historical foundations and contexts.
For example, we carefully study Mao Zedong's two classic works, On Contradiction (1937) and On Practice (1937), study them in conjunction with The Communist Manifesto, and analyze the differences in the understanding of dialectical materialism and historical materialism in China, the West, and the Soviet Union. Then, we continue to study how successive CCP leaderships have used these ideas to formulate policies and achieve various results, such as "one country, two systems", "socialist market economy", "moderately prosperous society", "dual circulation", "win-win foreign policy", etc.
I teach both Chinese and international students. I am sure that students from both groups find these courses useful because they are eager to understand the logic and values that drive national rejuvenation and China's rise as a great power. In fact, it is not difficult to demonstrate the power and wisdom of "Sinicized Marxism". Look around and the results speak for themselves.
Q: How do you evaluate Trump's current financial restrictions and administrative intervention on universities such as Harvard and Columbia? Although American universities have surpassed China in absolute numbers in the world's top universities, what do you think of the actual situation of higher education in China and the United States? Where are the differences?
Mahoney: For decades, American universities have imposed incredibly inflationary costs on students and have colluded with the government and interest groups to form a powerful lobby with the ability to influence policymakers. They have siphoned billions of dollars from students and billions of dollars from government grants and contracts. While Harvard and other elite schools have long been considered the best in the world, they are also the worst in terms of the practices I have described.
Indeed, beginning in the 1980s, accelerating through the 1990s, and reaching a roughly peak in the early 2000s, many American universities adopted and perfected a “higher education business model.” This involved treating students as “customers” while hollowing out the actual quality of their educational services, in part by making most faculty “adjuncts,” with inadequate pay or benefits, few institutional rights, forced to teach six classes per semester just to make ends meet, and obliged to give students good grades to ensure positive teaching evaluations.
Meanwhile, universities continue to cozy up to the US government and US corporations. When the US waged the war on terror, many US universities turned to receiving grants and contracts and sidestepped uncomfortable questions about the illegal invasion of Iraq and policies that allowed the torture of prisoners. As corporations increased their donations, this ensured that universities could silence internal critics, even when there was clear corporate malfeasance. Most universities did so by promoting “multiculturalism,” which has always been a superficial logic of inclusion in the US, with the goal of increasing enrollment and support, which requires corporate-style discipline. University presidents became CEOs, and deans took orders, overturning the old “faculty governance” model that had previously ensured universities were democratic and committed to high academic standards. This “CEO-style” business model has greatly contributed to the cancel culture and free speech cuts that are prevalent in US institutions today, which target both the left and the right, which recently won and exercised power in unprecedented ways, and is now turning back to target these targets.
Trump can attack American universities because he is willing to test the gray areas of presidential authority and because he knows that many Americans resent elite universities, which they know they could never attend and believe look down on them, even as universities continue to grow on public funding and exacerbate America’s deficit woes. Many recognize that these universities contribute to America’s soft power and scientific and cultural advances, including intellectual property, but they believe that these benefits disproportionately benefit the institutions themselves and other social, political, and economic elites, including a growing tech industry oligarchy that many Americans also resent.
It is impossible to compare Chinese and American universities, although there has been a tendency to do so. What they have in common is that American universities expanded their enrollments significantly after World War II, while China has also expanded its enrollments since 1999. That is, Chinese universities cannot operate as a powerful lobby group, directing national policies that may run counter to the national interest. Moreover, the best universities in China are public, while the best universities in the United States are private. The state-federal divide is another difference, as are admissions standards and fees.
Having trained and worked at multiple American universities, taught at Chinese universities for many years, and corresponded with former colleagues about the situations they face in the United States today, I am fairly convinced that Chinese universities are, in general, better places to study and work than American universities. This is one of the reasons I stayed at ECNU and one of the reasons my children study in China. Of course, there is still much room for improvement in Chinese higher education, but we have made critical breakthroughs and are still moving forward. We cannot say the same for American universities.
Q: China and the United States have been engaged in a tariff trade war for nearly eight years. The U.S. high tariff policy toward China is generally stable and continuous. How do you think the Sino-U.S. tariff war will develop? What is the most far-reaching impact of the tariff war on Sino-U.S. relations?
Mahoney: Despite the United States increasingly embracing great power competition rather than cooperation, it is clear that the United States is underperforming in competition. The first is a problem of systemic competition: China's system is thriving, and the United States' system is declining. Second, American companies are increasingly unable to compete with Chinese companies, whether because of price, marketing, or product quality and innovation. An example is why pay more for Tesla or Apple when BYD or Huawei can bring more value?
In short, the United States is unhappy with China’s rise as a great power, an advanced technological nation at the forefront of global affairs and the fourth industrial revolution. The United States is unhappy with China’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty and security, including its ability to resist U.S. hegemony and unilateralism. The United States is unhappy with the tremendous success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, China’s unique reform capabilities, and the significant improvements in China’s governance. In addition, as China cleverly resists and avoids becoming a digital colony of U.S. tech giants, avoiding being overwhelmed by U.S. propaganda and soft power by limiting its ability to manipulate the Chinese people or exploit their data, U.S. tech oligarchs directly linked to the U.S. mainstream media spread toxic information about China to the American people and the rest of the world, including grotesque lies, and essentially pay politicians to say the same, while encouraging “anti-China populism” not only in the United States but also in other countries.
At the same time, the United States has experienced a relative and absolute decline in status. American voters have been misled into believing that China’s development has come at their expense. They are unwilling to admit that they have squandered the world’s most powerful economy, most powerful currency, and most powerful military through costly wars, low to zero corporate taxes, deficit spending, failure to invest in public services and infrastructure, failure to address climate change, and even failure to address outbreaks like the coronavirus.
Ultimately, the trade war will hit the US harder than China. China can turn to its domestic market and can achieve a “dual circulation” where Chinese companies can sell and buy more products from other countries, excluding the US if necessary. I am optimistic that we will see more regional trade integration through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), ASEAN, and a possible trilateral trade agreement between China, Japan, and South Korea. In fact, a key question now is whether Chinese consumers will be willing to buy US products even if a trade deal is reached? Will Chinese producers be willing to sell to the US again? Ultimately, while the US is trying to poison China’s image, it ends up poisoning its own “brand”, while Chinese brands have won status at home and abroad.
Q: How do you understand the rise of Trump and Vance in American politics? The United States is the "benchmark" of the democratic world, but many of Trump's actions violate the US Constitution and have triggered widespread protests. Is this a victory or a setback for democracy? What is the biggest impact of Trump's rise on American politics?
Mahoney: I don’t believe that the United States can be the “standard bearer” of democracy in the world. That has always been the case in places where U.S. foreign policy has taken a heavy hand. Of course, some are misled to think that the democratic practices at home, while seemingly strong, can be viewed separately from the undemocratic U.S. foreign policy, but more and more people in the United States and abroad understand the undemocratic nature of both and that these are not new developments. What was the last country in the world that the United States promoted to achieve democracy, including itself? I can’t think of one.
Some wonder if the United States has reached a point where the Constitution has failed. Has the Constitution already failed, we might ask? Successive presidents have ruled by decree, Congress has failed to fulfill its legislative and oversight responsibilities, and the judiciary is highly politicized and divided. Polarization has hindered constitutional reform. These are just a few indicators of constitutional failure. In fact, Trump’s rise to power was already a sign of a constitutional crisis, and his first and second terms created new crises. Recall that he had previously been impeached for abuse of power, obstruction of Congress, and incitement of insurrection. That he was re-elected anyway speaks volumes about the value of the Constitution in today’s America.
Some have suggested that the United States may be approaching a kind of “cold civil war.” I am generally skeptical of such descriptions—cold violence vs. violence, cold war vs. war, cold civil war vs. civil war. That is, however defined, civil war is possible but unlikely. Trump could exercise and expand presidential power significantly, but I do not believe he could pull off an outright coup. Also, his political tactics are almost always self-defeating. This is a common observation, and there are many historical examples, including those of “Trump 1.0.” Leaders of this kind always go too far but never go far enough. They always fail, first and foremost, because they exploit rather than solve underlying social, political, and economic problems. In Trump’s case, this is made worse by the fact that he is deeply reactionary and relies on charisma. Much of his thinking seems to be a complete regression to a weird mashup of Jacksonian diplomacy, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Reagan Revolution, while simultaneously undermining the nation, the economy, higher education, and foreign relations. If people did not learn that Trump’s MAGA vision advocates an imagined past and an unattainable future during his first term, they are certainly learning that now.
Q: With the influence of FT Chinese in the global Chinese-speaking world, do you have anything to say to Chinese readers? What is your outlook on Sino-US relations?
Mahoney: China must continue to treat its sovereignty as sacrosanct while adhering to a principle-based foreign policy. China must continue to advance economic structural reforms, adhere to a people-centered approach, ensure green development, and achieve socialist modernization. We live in a period of intersectional singularities and the potential for escalation of crises. But China remains a stable country and a resolute great power. In fact, we should recognize that China's political system, from the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921 to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, was born in the severe test of national survival crises. No other political system in history has demonstrated such a strong ability to handle crises and adapt despite the most difficult challenges. Therefore, whether you are in China or not, you should believe that China will move forward, and you should also consider doing so, hand in hand with the Chinese people.
Yet we are not determinists. We do have to worry about tipping points and potential cascading effects. Trump’s policies could accelerate “de-dollarization,” recession, a global arms race, international conflict, climate change, and “black swan” events such as pandemics. The United States has demonstrated that this is a clear and present danger to itself and the rest of the world. It is an unreliable partner, heavily armed but with declining fortunes. Therefore, the world needs a strong power like China in a multipolar world to help offset the various risks foreshadowed by the United States. The world needs China’s new internationalism, including initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the “new multilateralism” of the SCO and BRICS, and China’s unwavering support for the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization. The “South” especially needs China as an advocate and leader to realize the potential for common development and a shared future for mankind.
To be sure, I would like to see a positive turn in U.S.-China relations, first and foremost because I am an American who wants the United States to do better and work with China to meet the needs of each other and the wider world. But I am not too hopeful about that, and I am more interested in seeing improvements in China's relations with other countries, such as India. If such a breakthrough can be achieved, then the U.S. strategic game becomes largely irrelevant.
(Note: Wang Yingliang holds a PhD in International Political Economy from Fudan University. He is currently promoting the “100 Interviews with 100 People on US-China Relations” column. His WeChat ID is porsche910114. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. The editor’s email address is bo.liu@ftchinese.com)
https://www.ftchinese.com/story/001106824
Original Chinese Version
Close doors
Reduce funding
Terrorize scholars
And the list goes on